SUPREME COURT, U. S.

IN THE

MAY 17 1974

DAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973

No. 73-1722

MURRAY KAPLAN,

Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

FLEISHMAN, MCDANIEL, BROWN & WESTON,
By STANLEY FLEISHMAN,
6922 Hollywood Boulevard,
Suite 718,
Hollywood, Calif. 90028,
Attorney for Petitioner.

SAM ROSENWEIN,
DAVID M. BROWN,
Of Counsel.

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622

SUBJECT INDEX

	Page
Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented	2
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved	4
Statement	5
How the Federal Questions Are Presented	5
Reasons for Granting the Writ	9
Conclusion	17

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A. Judgment of the Appellate Department	App. p. 1
Appendix B. Order Denying Rehearing	2
Appendix C. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved	3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases	Page
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195	14
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.196	15
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.353	15
Enskat v. California (October Term 1973), No. 73-1136, pp. 19-24	8, 15, 16
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.399	14
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.518	14
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.242	14
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S.676	14
Kaplan v. California, 408 U.S.921	5
Kaplan v. California, October Term 1971, No. 71-1422	5
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S.115	1, 3, 5
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.413	3, 4 ....9, 10, 11, 15
Miller v. California, 413 U.S.15	3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13
Papochristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S.156	14
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.49	3, 5, 10
People v. Enskat, 33 Cal.App.3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr.433	6, 8, 15, 16
Plummer v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 94 S.Ct.17	14
Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S.313	15
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S.749	15
Smith v. California, 361 U.S.147	2
Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S.199	16
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.139	3
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S.123	3

Page

Vachon v. New Hampshire, 94 S.Ct.664 16

Virginia Ry. Co. v. Mullins, 271 U.S.220 2

Winship, In re, 397 U.S.358 .....15, 16

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.507 14

Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal.2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal.Rptr.800 (1963) 9

Rules

California Rules of Court, Rule 24(a) 2

California Rules of Court, Rule 28(b) 2

California Rules of Court, Rule 62 2

Statutes

California Penal Code, Sec. 311 .....2, 3, 4 .....5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16

California Penal Code, Sec. 311.2 .....2, 3, 4 .....5, 7, 8, 9, 13

California Penal Code, Sec. 1471 2

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1257(3) 2

United States Constitution, First Amendment ....2, 3 .....4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 15

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973
No. .....

MURRAY KAPLAN,

Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

Petitioner Murray Kaplan prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and ruling of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, entered in the above entitled action on January 29, 1974.

Opinions Below.

No written opinion was rendered by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles affirming the judgment of conviction on January 29, 1974.[1]

[1]The affirmance followed remand by this Court in *Kaplan v. California,* 413 U.S.115.

Jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles was entered on January 29, 1974. A copy of the judgment appears in Appendix A hereto. A due and timely petition for rehearing or, in the alternative, for certification of the cause to the Court of Appeal was denied by the said Appellate Department on February 20, 1974. A copy of the said order appears in Appendix B hereto.

By the aforesaid denial of the petition for rehearing or, in the alternative, for transfer to the Court of Appeal, the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles became the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had. See, California Penal Code §1471; California Rules of Court, Rule 62. See also, California Rules of Court, Rules 24(a) and 28(b); *Smith v. California,* 361 U.S.147, 148, fn.2; *Virginia Ry. Co. v. Mullins,* 271 U.S.220, 222.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

Questions Presented.

(1) Whether the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2, on their face and as construed and applied to authorize the judgment of conviction herein, violate the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the interpretive decisions of the Supreme

Court rendered on June 21, 1973, in *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S.15; *Kaplan v. California*, 413 U.S.115; *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S.49; *United States v. Orito*, 413 U.S.139; and *United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels*, 413 U.S.123.

(2) Whether the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2, which embody solely the *Memoirs* tripartite standards for judging obscenity, including the "utterly without redeeming social importance" test, on their face and as construed and applied to authorize the judgment of conviction herein, are vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad, in violation of the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the aforesaid decisions of the Court rendered on June 21, 1973.

(3) Whether the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2, which embody solely the *Memoirs* tripartite standards for judging obscenity, on their face and as construed and applied to authorize the judgment of conviction herein, without the use of a national community standard test which at the time of the trial of the petitioner limited state obscenity prosecutions, are vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad, in violation of the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the aforesaid decisions of the Court rendered on June 21, 1973.

(4) Whether the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2, which embody solely the

Memoirs tripartite standards for judging obscenity, and which do not specifically define sexual conduct purportedly subject to regulation, on their face and as construed and applied to authorize the judgment of conviction herein, are vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad, in violation of the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the aforesaid decisions of the Court rendered on June 21, 1973.

(5) Whether the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2, on their face and as construed and applied to authorize the judgment of conviction herein, without any instruction to the jury on the applicable law of the case with respect to the specifically defined sexual conduct which the state obscenity statute purportedly proscribed, violate the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

(6) Whether the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2, on their face and as construed and applied to authorize the judgment of conviction, without proof of the essential element of *scienter*, violate the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.

The pertinent provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and the pertinent provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2 appear in Appendix C hereto.

Statement.

A petition for a writ of certiorari was initially granted in this case by this Court on June 26, 1972. *Kaplan v. California,* 408 U.S.921. Following hearing before the Court, the case was decided on June 21, 1973. *Kaplan v. California,* 413 U.S.115. The ultimate ruling of the Court was that the judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, which had initially affirmed the judgment of conviction, be vacated and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinions of the Court in *Miller v. California,* 413 U.S.15, and *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,* 413 U.S.49, decided on the same day. The nature of the case and all prior state court proceedings appear in the briefs of the parties and the final opinion rendered by the Court. *Kaplan v. California,* October Term 1971, No. 71-1422.

How the Federal Questions Are Presented.

1. Following remand to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, there was further briefing and argument before the said court. Petitioner urged that the judgment of conviction should be reversed upon the following grounds, among others: (a) The standards for judging obscenity embodied in the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2 have been rejected as constitutionally impermissible by the rulings of the Court on June 21, 1973; (b) the aforesaid

provisions under which the judgment of conviction was rendered are vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad; (c) the standards for judging obscenity contained in the statute are unworkable and incapable of objective measurement; (d) the statute fails to proscribe specifically defined sexual conduct; (e) the proceedings against petitioner arbitrarily, capriciously and discriminatorily deprived petitioner of his liberty and property without due process of law, abridged the exercise of freedoms of speech and press, denied the equal protection of the laws, and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (f) the state obscenity statute, on its face and as construed and applied to authorize the jury to return a verdict of guilt against petitioner, without any instructions relative to the specifically defined sexual conduct allegedly proscribed by the law, as judicially construed, deprived petitioner of his liberty and property without due process of law and abridged the exercise of freedoms of speech and press, contrary to the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2. Pending the ruling by the aforesaid Appellate Department of the Superior Court, an intervening ruling by the Court of Appeal of the State of California was rendered which affected the ultimate ruling by the Appellate Department. The circumstances were as follows:

Following the decisions of this Court of June 21, 1973, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, rendered an opinion in a case entitled *People v. Enskat,* 33 Cal. App.3d 900, 109 Cal.Rptr.433. The court rejected

the claim that California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2 were unconstitutional and unenforceable as a result of the decisions of this Court on June 21, 1973, as against claims that in the light of those decisions the California state obscenity statute had been rendered vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad, in violation of the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeal held that the state obscenity statute, as written, could continue to be applied in state obscenity prosecutions.

A petition for hearing to the California Supreme Court was denied on October 24, 1973. Among the questions presented to the California Supreme Court were whether the standards for judging obscenity embodied in the California state obscenity statute have been rejected as constitutionally impermissible by the rulings of this Court on June 21, 1973, and whether the provisions of California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2 are vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad, since the standards for judging obscenity are unworkable and incapable of objective measurement and the statute fails to proscribe specifically defined sexual conduct, all in violation of the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeal, as aforestated, and the denial of hearing thereafter by the California Supreme Court on October 24, 1973, rejecting all constitutional objections to the state obscenity statute, became binding upon the Appellate Department of the Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, State of California, in the then pending appeals before it in obscenity prosecutions.

A petition for a writ of certiorari to the aforesaid Court of Appeal in *Enskat v. California* has been filed with this Court, October Term 1973, No. 73-1136.

3. As a result of the ruling by the Court of Appeal in *Enskat*, holding that California Penal Code §311.2 meets the standards set forth in this Court's decisions of June 21, 1973, and is not vague or overbroad, the judgment of conviction in the case herein was affirmed by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, without opinion. On petition for rehearing or, in the alternative, for certification of transfer, the same aforestated constitutional and legal questions were urged upon the court. The petition for rehearing or, in the alternative, for certification was denied, as aforesaid. Thereafter, a remittitur issued from the Appellate Department, but on March 6, 1974, the court ordered recall of the remittitur and stayed the issuance of the said remittitur to and including April 10, 1974, to permit petitioner to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, the order also providing that any further stay thereafter was to come from this Court or a Justice thereof. On April 8, 1974, an order was made by Mr. Justice Douglas, continuing the order recalling the remittitur and staying its issuance, pending reconsideration of the application when the memorandum of the respondent is received.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

1. The provisions of the California obscenity law (Penal Code §§311, 311.2) solely embody the *Memoirs* test. The statute defines "obscene matter", taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average person, applying contemporary standards, is to a prurient interest, *i.e.*, a shameful or morbid interest in sex, nudity or excretion; and is matter which, taken as a whole, goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in the depiction or representation of sex or nudity; and is matter which, taken as a whole, is utterly without redeeming social importance. The state legislature "intentionally incorporated as part of the definition itself the important provision that obscene matter 'is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance', changing the function of these words from a description of a matter of defense to an element of the offense". *Zeitlin v. Arnebergh*, 59 Cal.2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal.Rptr.800, 812 (1963). See, *Memoirs v. Massachusetts*, 383 U.S.413.

The state obscenity law does not define for regulation any specific sexual conduct. The petitioner herein was tried for an offense allegedly committed in 1969, and the standards for judging obscenity which were used by the trial judge and jury in the case, resulting in the judgment of conviction herein, were predicated solely upon the tripartite test as appears in the state obscenity law.

2. In *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S.15, this Court noted that since the decision in *Roth*, no majority of the Court had at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the

State's police power. The Court stated that ". . . we are called on to define the standards which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may regulate without infringing the First Amendment as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment" (413 U.S. at 19-20).

Before enunciating the standards for judging obscenity, the Court unanimously rejected the *Memoirs* test. "The case we now review was tried on the theory that the California Penal Code §311 approximately incorporates the three-stage *Memoirs* test, *supra.* But now the *Memoirs* test has been abandoned as unworkable by its author and no member of the Court today supports the *Memoirs* formulation." (413 U.S. at 23). The opinion of the Chief Justice noted the observation by Justice Harlan that "utterly without redeeming social value" did not seem to have "any meaning at all". Moreover, stated the majority opinion: "We do not adopt *as a constitutional standard* the 'utterly without redeeming social value' test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts." (413 U.S. at 24). Further, it was emphasized, "We also reject, *as a constitutional standard, the ambiguous concept* of 'social importance'." (413 U.S. at 25, n.7) (Emphasis added). Justice Brennan, dissenting in *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,* 413 U.S. at 73, to which the Chief Justice pointed in *Miller,* agreed that the Court had "failed to formulate a standard that sharply distinguishes protected from unprotected speech", (413 U.S. at 83), and that none of the differing formulas enunciated by the individual Justices in the past could "reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level" (413 U.S. at 84). As a result of "our failure to define standards with predictable application", the past had been marked by a "lack of fair notice" and a

"chill on protected expression" (413 U.S. at 93). And Mr. Justice Douglas added in his dissenting opinion in *Miller:* "The Court has worked hard to define obscenity and concededly has failed." (413 U.S. at 37).

Petitioner submits, with deference, that the only conclusion which can be drawn from the opinion of the Court in the quintet of decisions rendered on June 21, 1973, is that a statute which purports to identify and delimit "obscenity" by a test of "utterly without redeeming social importance" is constitutionally unacceptable. In the view of this Court, the test is unworkable, inoperable, unachievable, vague and ambiguous. It is, in the words of this Court, ambiguous and vague and cannot be accepted "as a constitutional standard".

3. Another prong of the tripartite test of *Memoirs* which this Court found constitutionally infirm was the "national community" standard. This Court described such standard as "unrealistic" and "an exercise in futility". A national standard was termed "hypothetical" and "unascertainable"; a standard which was not "provable" and "neither realistic nor constitutionally sound" (413 U.S. at 31-32). Thus, the "national standard" test was found to be clearly unconstitutional. Nevertheless, such standard was "correctly regarded at the time of trial as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case law" (413 U.S. at 30-31).

Unlike the record presented in the case of *Miller v. California,* the petitioner here constantly objected to the use of a state community standard instead of a national community standard, as then required under the interpretive decisions of this Court. On appeal, petitioner specifically urged that the state obscenity law,

as construed and applied to authorize the judgment of conviction, solely upon the basis of a state standard instead of a national standard, violated the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Thus, petitioner was not only tried under the constitutionally vague and ambiguous standard of "utterly without redeeming social importance", but he was also refused a trial under a "national standard of First Amendment protection", correctly regarded at the time of trial "as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case law".

4. As heretofore stated, the state statute under which the judgment of conviction rests does not specifically define any physical sexual conduct allegedly subject to regulation. The statute only proscribes expression. This, again, is a defect of constitutional dimension, as the Court in its decisions of June 21, 1973, made clear.

> "We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. . . . As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed . . . the basic guidelines for the trier of facts must be: . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law . . . We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the States. That must await their

> concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, however, to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation under the second part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion . . . Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed." (413 U.S. at 23-27).

Since the requirement that a state statute specifically define the sexual conduct the State proposes to regulate was deemed by this Court in *Miller* to be a critical due process requirement in order to satisfy that "precision of regulation" which the first Amendment demands, the absence of such specificity in California Penal Code §§311 and 311.2 is a third ground for invalidating the judgment of conviction herein.

5. In the light of the foregoing, the provisions of the state obscenity law are vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad. The statute, on its face and as construed and applied to the petitioner herein, violates the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the interpretive decisions of this Court. A trial conducted under statutes which are unascertainable, ambiguous, without clear meaning, incapable of objective measurement, and not limited to specified conduct, is a deprivation of due process in the most primary sense. Standards which are not specifically defined in the law, and which are incapable of objective measurement, fail to provide adequate notice to persons who are engaged in ac-

tivities which the statute purports to proscribe. In an area where First Amendment rights are implicated, the danger of such lack of meaningful standards is that the statute may sweep within its ambit expression ordinarily entitled to constitutional protection. Such statutes lend themselves to arbitrary and capricious enforcement by law enforcement officers and prosecutors and result in capricious and erratic judgments by courts and juries. *Plummer v. City of Columbus, Ohio,* 94 S.Ct.17; *Gooding v. Wilson,* 405 U.S.518; *Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,* 390 U.S.676; *Papochristou v. Jacksonville,* 405 U.S.156; *Ashton v. Kentucky,* 384 U.S.195; *Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,* 382 U.S.399; *Winters v. New York,* 333 U.S.507.

The submission of the issues to the jury in this case, in the light of the absence of constitutionally accepted standards for judging obscenity, amounted to no more than a request for the jurors to assert their own subjective and unguided predilections with respect to the suppression of a motion picture film. The petitioner was deprived of a jury trial in the constitutional sense because the jury was merely licensed to create its own law of the case, its own personal standards. See, *Herndon v. Lowry,* 301 U.S.242.

The trial in the case herein, conducted as it was under the existing statutes, was a denial of due process. The statute does not contain the specific sexual conduct proscribed. The standards which are contained in the statute have been held to be constitutionally infirm. The law therefore did not give fair notice to

this petitioner of what was forbidden. Neither the charge nor the proof at the trial ever gave petitioner fair notice that criminal liability was dependent upon violations of specifically defined conduct or standards contained in the statute, See, *Rabe v. Washington*, 405 U.S.313; *Russell v. United States*, 369 U.S.749; *De Jonge v. Oregon*, 299 U.S.353; *Cole v. Arkansas*, 333 U.S.196.

Even the rudimentary requirements in criminal prosecutions of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (*In re Winship*, 397 U.S.358) were violated when petitioner in this case was compelled to stand trial under the state obscenity statute which, on its face and as construed and applied, is vague, ambiguous, uncertain and overbroad.

6. The *Enskat* ruling which became binding upon the Appellate Department of the Superior Court below appears contrary to the principles enunciated by this Court on June 21, 1973. In essence, the *Enskat* court held that a state statute which entirely omits the prerequisite of sexual conduct specifically defined by law, and which retains the tripartite test of *Memoirs* as the sole basis for the suppression of expression and for criminal prosecution thereunder, may be deemed valid despite the free speech and press and due process provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and the interpretive decisions of this Court.

The *Enskat* court appears to have been of the view that increased specificity in the state law was not re-

quired if the "utterly without redeeming social value" test was retained. However, this Court in its decisions on June 21, 1973, gave no indication that the retention of the "utterly without redeeming social value" test would in any way justify omitting specifically defined sexual conduct from a statute. This Court emphasized that if the requirements of due process notice are to be met, a state statute must specifically define the sexual conduct. Without such specificity in the statute, an obscenity law is rendered unconstitutionally vague, ambigous, uncertain and overbroad. Contrary to the view enunciated in *Enskat*, the California Supreme Court has never authoritatively construed the state obscenity statute to specifically include the sexual conduct which this Court held essential to the validity of a state obscenity statute. See the discussion in the petition for a writ of certiorari in *Enskat v. California*, October Term 1973, No. 73-1136, pages 19-24.

7. At the time the alleged offense herein was committed, California Penal Code §311 defined "knowingly" as meaning "having knowledge that the material is obscene". The record does not contain any competent evidence, it is submitted, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner here knew the alleged obscene nature and character of the publication. See, *Thompson v. Louisville*, 362 U.S.199; *In re Winship*, 397 U.S.358; *Vachon v. New Hampshire*, 94 S.Ct. 664.

Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the judgment and ruling of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

Respectfully submitted,

FLEISHMAN, MCDANIEL, BROWN & WESTON,
By STANLEY FLEISHMAN,
Attorney for Petitioner.

SAM ROSENWEIN,
DAVID M. BROWN,
Of Counsel.

APPENDIX A.

Judgment of the Appellate Department.

In the Appellate Department of the Superior Court, of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

Filed January 29, 1974.

People of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Murray Kaplan, Defendant and Appellant. Superior Court No. CR A 10391; Trial Court No. 337520.

On Appeal from the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, David J. Aisenson, Judge (311.2 PC).

This cause having been argued and submitted and fully considered, judgment is ordered as follows:

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment made and entered in the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, in the above entitled cause be and the same is hereby affirmed.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Zack
Acting Presiding Judge.

/s/ Holmes
Judge.

/s/ Marshall
Judge

APPENDIX B.

Order Denying Rehearing.

Filed: February 20, 1974.

Appellate Department of the Superior Court, of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

People of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Murray Kaplan, Defendant and Appellant. Superior Court No. CR A 10391; Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District No. 337520.

ORDER DENYING REHEARING AND DENYING CERTIFICATION

The petition of appellant for a rehearing after judgment of this court on appeal, or, in the alternative, petition for certification of cause to the Court of Appeal in the above-entitled case, having been filed and having been duly considered,

Said petition is hereby denied.

Dated Feb. 20, 1974.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Zack
Acting Presiding Judge

/s/ Holmes
Judge

/s/ Marshall
Judge

APPENDIX C.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.

1. The pertinent provisions of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are:

> "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; . . ."

2. The pertinent provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are:

> "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ."

3. California Penal Code §311, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, provided as follows:

> "As used in this chapter:
>
> "(a) 'Obscene' means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
>
> "(b) 'Matter' means any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial representation or any statue or other figure, or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines or materials.

"(c) 'Person' means any individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other legal entity.

"(d) 'Distribute' means to transfer possession of, whether with or without consideration.

"(e) 'Knowingly' means having knowledge that the matter is obscene."

4. California Penal Code §311.2, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, read in relevant part:

"(a) Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . ."